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AUDIT COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE TONE  
AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
 






This paper examines the effect of audit committee reporting, measured by the tone of 
audit committee disclosures, in improving financial reporting quality as proxied by 
earnings management. 
  
Design / Methods 
We focus on the textual properties of AC reports, particularly the tone of AC 
disclosure, and their impact on financial reporting quality proxied using real and 
accruals-based earnings management. For additional analysis, we use a financial 




Our analysis suggests that audit committee reports are not boilerplate but varied in 
language. We find audit committee reporting is negatively associated with both real 
and accruals-based earnings management. In our additional tests, we find a positive 
association between financial reporting quality index and reporting tone. 
 
Originality / value:  
Though the importance of AC disclosures in improving reporting quality is well 
recognised in policy guidelines and governance recommendations, no study has 
employed computer-based textual analysis of AC reports and investigated the effect 
of AC disclosure tone and the role it can play in achieving higher reporting quality.  
 
Research Implications:  
Overall, our paper provides baseline evidence for future research and policy making 
and reveals that ACs reporting what they have done increases transparency and 
impacts on reporting quality. 
 
 
Keywords: audit committees; voluntary disclosure; earnings management; textual 
analysis.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance can affect the quality of financial reporting. While there is 
evidence to suggest that governance structures reduce earnings management, there is 
limited evidence on how audit committee (AC) reporting affects financial reporting 
quality. Guidelines on AC role and responsibilities in the UK require ACs to report on 
significant issues considered in relation to financial reports and auditing (FRC, 2012). 
This paper focuses on the textual properties of AC reports, particularly the tone of AC 
disclosures, and examines the effect of AC reporting in improving financial reporting 
quality as proxied by earnings management.  
Recognizing that reporting by ACs in relation to their activities may impact on 
the quality of financial reporting, we draw on the literature on textual properties and 
focus on the tone of AC reports. Our paper extends the literature which has mainly 
investigated the relationship between ACs characteristics and financial reporting 
quality. For example, studies show that AC expertise enhances earnings quality 
(Beasley et al., 2009; Bedard and Gendron, 2010; Cohen et al., 2013). A number of 
studies finds a positive association between AC size and the quality of financial 
reporting (e.g., Mangena and Pike, 2005; Li et al., 2012; Mangena and Tauringana, 
2008). Moreover, previous research has established the importance of active AC 
oversight of the financial reporting process for improving the quality reporting 
(Beasley et al., 2009; Zaman et al., 2011). Our paper also complements qualitative 
studies, mainly based on interviews with AC participants in small number of 
companies, on the AC process showing that AC actions play a key role in configuring 
meanings of effectiveness (Gendron and Bédard, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007; 
Beasley et al., 2009; Compernolle, 2018; Khemakhem and Fontaine, 2019).  It also adds 
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to the literature on AC disclosures (e.g., Guttierrez et al., 2018; Lennox et al., 2018 and 
Czerney et al., 2019; Sahyoun and Magnan, 2020) through a focus on the textual 
properties of AC reports, particularly the tone of AC disclosures, and examining the 
effects on financial reporting quality as proxied by earnings management.  
Our analyses based on a sample of UK FTSE 350 firms support our hypothesis 
that the tone of AC report disclosures is negatively associated with earnings 
management and suggest the tone of AC disclosures, as expressed in the choice of 
words used in describing AC engagement, conveys information that affects the 
communication function of AC reporting thereby improving reporting quality. Our 
analysis indicates that AC reports are not boilerplate but varied in language choice 
which contributes to improving financial reporting quality. Moreover, our findings 
also hold when we control for endogeneity. When we use alternative proxies for 
financial reporting quality, we find that AC disclosure tone has a significant and 
negative association with accrual-based earnings and a positive and significant 
association with the financial reporting quality index.  
In contrast to the predominant focus in existing studies on the US setting, our 
study is based on the UK context. The UK provides a meaningful and useful context 
for our study. First, as noted by Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013), evidence on the 
financial reporting effects of ACs in the UK setting is quite limited. Key exceptions 
include: Peasnell et al. (2005), Mangena and Pike (2005), Mangena and Tauringana 
(2008) and Li et al. (2012). Second, compared to US regulations on corporate 
governance which are relatively rigid, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the 
UK adopts a softer, comply or explain regulatory approach (FRC, 2012b).  Third, the 
higher risk of litigation can inhibit the management of US firms from making detailed 
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voluntary disclosures about governance practices (Francis et al., 1994; Baginski et al., 
2002). Whereas, under the UK’s flexible governance environment, risk of litigation 
from shareholders or other stakeholders is relatively low (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; 
Black et al., 2005).   
Though the importance of AC disclosures in improving reporting quality is 
well recognised in policy guidelines and governance recommendations, to the best of 
our knowledge, no study has employed computer-based textual analysis of AC 
reports and investigated the effect of AC disclosure tone and the role it can play in 
achieving higher reporting quality. Overall, our paper provides baseline evidence for 
future research and policy making and reveals that ACs reporting what they have 
done increases transparency and impacts on reporting quality.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes prior 
literature. Section 3 develops the hypothesis. Section 4 describes the research method 
including model specification, variable measurement, and the sample. Section 5 
presents the findings while in section 6 we provide a summary and conclusion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The theoretical underpinning for ACs is based on agency theory which leads to an 
expectation that effective ACs will enhance governance and the quality of financial 
reporting and auditing (Turley and Zaman 2007; Ghafran and O'Sullivan, 2017). 
Beasley et al. (2009) argue that agency theory is relevant in enhancing our 
understanding of the role of governance in the audit process since the audit is focused 
on financial reporting and internal control. Agency theory suggests that factors that 
create the need for closer monitoring of management produce the need for effective 
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ACs (Collier and Zaman, 2005; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Zhou et al., 2018). From an 
agency perspective firms with high information asymmetry and agency costs will be 
inclined to reduce such costs by providing substantive oversight and disclosure 
relating to governance (Piot and Janin, 2007). Earnings management intended to 
mislead stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the firm can 
compromise reporting quality. A primary purpose of ACs is thus to constrain earnings 
management. Overall, prior research suggests that ACs are associated with improved 
financial reporting (Zaman et al., 2011; Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2013; Badolato et al., 
2014; Khemakhem and Fontaine, 2019). ACs reporting publicly on significant issues 
considered in relation to financial reporting and auditing, and how these issues have 
been addressed can increase the transparency of their monitoring. Moreover, it may 
also intensify AC substantive oversight and thereby improve quality of reporting.  
A focus on AC reporting enables us to respond to the call for more research, 
inter-alia, by Beasley et al. (2009: p113): “of particular importance is whether 
variations in process are associated with variations in financial reporting and 
governance outcomes, above and beyond previously documented relations between 
AC characteristics and financial reporting outcomes”. Our focus also resonates with 
reviews of AC literature by Bedard and Gendron (2010) as well as Broye and Johannes 
(2021) who suggest that despite the existing literature focusing on AC characteristics, 
our understanding of their effects is still limited and call for more research that helps 
to increase understanding of ACs. McNulty et al. (2013) also argue that examining AC 
attributes alone fails to capture what really goes on in ACs. Our focus on AC reporting 
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Research on textual analysis of corporate disclosures focuses on textual analysis of the 
readability and tone dimensions of annual reports (see Li, 2008; Lehavy et al., 2011; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2014; Ajina et al., 2016). Several studies examine whether 
companies use tone in qualitative disclosures to convey fundamental information. 
Bicudo de Castro et al. (2019) find that annual reports that convey positive tone are 
associated with lower audit fees. Davis et al. (2012) find that the increase in tone 
optimism of earnings press releases leads to an immediate stock price response to 
earnings announcement and Davis and Tama‐Sweet (2012) argue that managers have 
incentives to use tone strategically in their qualitative disclosures and find that tone 
pessimism predicts poor future performance. Huang et al. (2013) find that abnormal 
positive tone misleads investors and reveals managerial incentives to misinform 
investors about future performance. Bassyouni et al. (2020) report that firms with high 
level of board independence have less positive tone in their narrative reporting.  
Some recent auditing literature focuses on changes in auditors’ reports and 
their informativeness. Textual analysis of audit reports is however limited and at an 
early stage. Gutierrez et al. (2018) investigate the UK requirement to expand auditors’ 
reports and find that mere increase in disclosures is not associated with increase in 
audit fees or informativeness. Similarly, Lennox et al. (2018) examine the 
informativeness of new reporting standards in UK that require auditors to disclose 
the risks of material misstatements and find these disclosures lack incremental 
information content, suggesting that the expanded audit reports do not provide 
investors with additional value-relevant information. In contrast to Gutierrez et al. 
(2018) and Lennox et al. (2018), Reid et al. (2019) examine the impact of UK’s auditor 
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reporting changes on financial reporting quality and find that the new auditor 
reporting requirements are associated with a significant improvement in financial 
reporting quality. Czerney et al. (2019) examine the explanatory language added to 
unqualified audit reports and how investors respond to such language. They find that 
investors generally do not respond to explanatory language at the time of the audit 
report release. Sahyoun and Magnan (2020) analyse AC disclosures based on 
recommendations from multiple industry and governance organisations’ reports and 
its association with banks’ earnings management and find that the voluntary 
disclosures in AC reports are used as a tool for impression management.  
There is scarcity of research focusing on the textual analysis of AC reports. We 
are able to identify one unpublished article that focuses on the textual analysis of AC 
reports. Draeger et al. (2019) undertake textual analysis of US firms’ AC reports and 
find that AC reports have become shorter over time and include fewer voluntary 
disclosures. The study finds no evidence that AC characteristics are associated with 
the level of disclosure in AC reports. Draeger et al. (2019) argue that AC reports 
typically use boilerplate language and present limited information on AC oversight 
of the external auditor.  
Samaha et al. (2015) in their review note that audit committees play a pivotal 
role by improving the quality of information disclosed. To the best of our knowledge, 
no previous study has examined the tone of AC reports and their impact on financial 
reporting quality. The language used in AC reports can give an insight into the nature 
of communication to the user (Coram et al., 2011). For example, if there is additional 
disclosure relating to risks of material restatements or going concern risk, the tone of 
information disclosed in AC reports is likely to be negatively affected. The linguistic 
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content of the corporate reports (including AC reports) is helpful in explaining firms’ 
reporting quality (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Therefore, we expect AC 
disclosure tone that conveys information which enhances users’ understanding of the 
audit process will affect the communication function of AC reporting and increase the 
transparency of AC monitoring and thereby improve financial reporting quality as 
proxied by earnings management.  
Overall, the tone of AC reporting is important because ACs help to create and 
maintain a reporting system and environment within firms that supports the integrity 
of the financial reporting process. AC disclosure tone can signal their attention and 
sharpen their focus on certain financial reporting items such as accounting 
adjustments and revenue recognition. AC disclosures with constrain tone to 
accounting figures (e.g., revenues recognition) can help increase reporting quality 
through lower earnings management. Moreover, AC disclosures with litigious tone 
relating to accounting entries (e.g., recording a provision) may help increase overall 
earnings quality. Our hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis. The tone of audit committee report disclosure is negatively associated with 
earnings management. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODS 
4.1. Sample and Data 
The sample for our study consists of FTSE 350 companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) during 2013 and 2014. The FTSE 350 represents highest market 
capitalization and are the centre of attention for investors, regulators and professional 
bodies. The time period is appropriate for the study as the AC reporting patterns over 
the period of two years since the issuance of the FRC’s revised guidelines for ACs 
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published in 2010 means sufficient time has lapsed for companies to achieve 
compliance.1 Financial data is collected from annual reports and DataStream. We 
remove financial firms and companies operating in the utility industry because these 
firms have unique regulatory environment. We also loose a few observations due to 
missing data for some of the financial variables. Table 1 shows how our sample which 
begins with 700 firm-years and ends with a final sample of 540 firm-years.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2. Earnings Management Measures 
Following prior studies our main proxy of earnings management is the real earnings 
management metrics (EM_RM). To capture the total effects of real earnings 
management, we follow Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and use an aggregate measure of 
real earnings management calculated as the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses 
multiplied by negative one (so that the higher amount, the more likely it is that the 
firm is cutting discretionary expenses) and abnormal production costs (increasing 
production to spread the fixed costs of production over a large number of units).2 (See 
untabulated Appendix 1 for detailed calculations of earnings management metrics). 
Following Cheng et al. (2016), we also use the performance-matched real earnings 
management (EM_PRM) as a proxy for financial reporting quality, where real 
earnings management is adjusted for the performance of a matched firm.  
 
1 The FRC revised guidelines recommend that the core functions of audit committees are expressed in terms of 
‘oversight’, ‘assessment’ and ‘review’ of a particular function (FRC, 2010). 
2 In untabulated analysis we include an aggregate measure of real earnings management that is equal to the sum 
of abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary expenses, both multiplied by negative one (so that the higher 
the values the more likely the firm is accelerating sales using aggressive price discounts and/or lenient credit terms 
and reducing the amount of discretionary expenses). Our inferences are qualitatively similar to those reported 
when we use this alternative measure, and therefore, for parsimony, we report the results using one aggregate 
measure of REM. 
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Additionally, we use the accrual-based earnings as an alternative measure of 
financial reporting quality. Prior studies often rely on the Jones Model (Jones, 1991) or 
the modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) to calculate accrual-based earnings. 
We use the modified Jones Model to measure the accrual-based earnings (EM_MJM) 
(untabulated Appendix 1).3 Prior research on accruals-based earnings suggests that 
discretionary accrual models might be misspecified when applied to firms with 
extreme financial performance (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005). The 
discretionary accrual measure is also adjusted for the accrual performance of a 
matched firm where matching is on the basis of return on assets and industry. 
Following Kothari et al. (2005) we also estimate performance-matched earnings 
management proxy (EM_PEM).4 Finally, we compute an index (FRQ_index) as an 
additional proxy by taking the standardised averages of EM proxies used in this 
study, i.e., EM_RM, EM_PRM, EM_MJM, and EM_PEM and multiply them by minus 
one so that it is increasing with reporting quality.5 
 
4.3. AC Reporting Tone  
In measuring the disclosure tone of AC reports we draw on prior literature that has 
focused on the textual analysis of financial reports.6 Various methods have been used 
 
3 Owens et al. (2017) show how idiosyncratic shocks to firms' operating environments can generate through several 
years of financial statements and reduce discretionary accrual models' goodness-of-fit, therefore, creating accrual 
model misspecification. They state “missing from accrual models are the underlying economic circumstances that 
give rise to firm performance. These circumstances often vary widely across firms and over time, resulting in 
different levels of expected accruals that the accrual models, by construction, do not capture.” (Owen et al., 2017, 
p.184). We use a sample of companies over a two-year period, hence due to data limitation, it is less likely that 
idiosyncratic shocks will impact on our accrual model. 
4 We also address the concern that firm growth may affect the discretionary accrual measure (Collins et al., 2016) 
by adjusting for sales growth. Our main results are unaffected when we make this adjustment. 
5 Similar to Biddle et al. (2009) we also estimate a principal-component analysis (PCA) in Stata software by taking 
the proxies of earnings management used in this study. The factor solution consists of two factors with eigenvalue 
larger than one (1.22). We multiply the PCA estimate by negative one so that it is increasing in reporting quality 
(untabulated). 
6 There is growing empirical research in accounting and finance using textual analysis of qualitative information. 
The disclosure channels used in the literature include annual reports/10-K/10-Q fillings (Li, 2008, 2010; Miller, 
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to measure qualitative disclosures, such as the naïve Bayesian machine-learning 
algorithm (Li, 2010), General Inquirer and Diction (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; 
Kothari et al., 2009), and Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Li, 2008; Draeger 
et al., 2019; Smith, 2019). These methods are based on using word dictionaries that 
have been transferred from the field of social psychology into the finance context 
(Kang et al., 2018). Loughran and McDonald (2011) argue that these psychological 
dictionaries are not suitable for financial disclosures and suggest the use of financial-
customised word list to better reflect the finance context. The authors created finance-
based word lists to describe the negative, positive, litigation, constrain, strong and 
weak tones in financial disclosures.  
Prior research on corporate disclosure has used various textual analysis 
measures to investigate the text-based information released by firms including 
readability (Li, 2008; Ajina et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2017; Lo et al., 2017; Luo et al., 2018), 
positive vs. negative tone (Davis et al., 2012), and aggregate tone (Huang et al., 2013; 
Kang et al., 2018). Kang et al. (2018) argue that when investors read financial reports 
and make investment decisions, they consider good and bad events alike. Therefore, 
separating the effects of positive and negative text-based information is more likely to 
lead to mixed findings. Purda and Skillicorn (2015) argue that linguistic analysis can 
be used effectively to detect unusual discrepancies in financial reporting. Their study 
uses language-based technique including the litigious and negative words lists form 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) as a tool for corporate fraud detection. Moreover, 
Bodnaruk et al. (2015) use textual analysis to measure the extent to which a firm is 
 
2010, You and Zhang, 2009; Ertugrul et al., 2017; Kang et al., 2018), earnings press release (Davis et al., 2012; Davis 
and Tama-Sweet, 2012; Huang et al., 2013), media news (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008), management discussion 
and analysis section of the annual report (Lo et al., 2017), and conference calls (Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2012). 
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financially constrained and create a constraining word list similar to the one used in 
Loughran and McDonald (2011). The study argues that companies facing financial 
challenges are more likely to use constraining tone in their 10-K fillings to 
communicate their concerns to shareholders, thereby reducing litigation exposure. 
We proxy for AC tone using three alternative measures: ACT_Litigious, 
ACT_Constrain and ACT_LIWC. We use the litigation and constrain word dictionaries 
created by Loughran and McDonald (2011) in our main tests similar to Bodnaruk et 
al. (2015) and Purda and Skillicorn (2015).7 Thus, we include ACT_Litigious measured 
by the word count frequency in the AC report based on the Loughran and McDonald 
Litigious Word List, ACT_Constrain is measured by the word count frequency in the 
AC report based on the Loughran and McDonald Constrain Word List.8 Also, similar 
to Kang et al. (2018), we define the tone as the frequency difference between the 
numbers of positive and negative words divided by the total word count using LIWC 
custom dictionary of positive and negative word lists.9 
 
4.4. Control Variables 
In testing our models, we control for AC, boards of directors and firm characteristics. 
We use ACStrength, similar to Zaman et al. (2011), to measure the strength of an AC 
computed by totalling the proxies of five AC characteristics. We measure the 
components using dummy industry-adjusted variables to enable the calculation of the 
composite measure of AC strength. Accordingly, all variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
7 We do not use Loughran and McDonald’s weak and strong word dictionaries due to low rates of occurrences in 
our sample. 
8 Loughran and McDonald‘s dictionary has 903 words included in the Litigious word list and 184 words included 
in the Constrain word list. 
9 We also calculate the tone based on Loughran and McDonald’s word list of positive and negative words. Our 
main results are unaffected (untabulated). 
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Similar to our measurement of AC strength, we use a composite measure for the 
strength of the corporate board, i.e., BODStrength computed by totalling the proxies 
of six board characteristics.   
Prior studies find firm-specific characteristics can affect earnings management 
we thus control for firm-specific variables. These are: firm size (SIZE) measured by 
the natural logarithm of total assets; firm age (FAGE) measured by the number of years 
since a firm has been listed on the London Stock Exchange; Business complexity 
(BSEG) calculated as the logarithm of the number of operating segments of the firm; 
leverage (LEV) measured by the ratio of total liabilities scaled by total assets; 
ownership concentration (OWN) measured by the sum of shares held by block-holders 
of greater than 5% divided by the total number of shares in issue; and firm profitability 
(ROA) measured by net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; a 
proxy for liquidity (CFO) which represents cash flow from operating activities divided 
by total assets; the annual growth of sales (Sales_growth) calculated as the change in 
sales from previous year scaled by sales at the beginning of the year; and industry and 
year dummies. 
 
4.5. Empirical Model  
We use the following model to estimate the impact of AC report tone (ACTone) on 
earnings management (EM). Since earnings management must occur prior to the 
financial year-end, and AC report is written after the financial year-end (Zang, 2012), 
we expect that the tone of AC reports to be associated with earnings management in 
the following financial year. Therefore, we apply one-year lag between our dependent 
and independent variables. The measurements are described separately in sections 3.2 
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and 3.3, and the control variables are described in section 3.4. All variables are defined 
in Table 2. 
!" =	%! + %"'()*+, + %#'(-./,+0.ℎ + %$234-./,+0.ℎ + %%-56! +
%&7'8! + %'	2-!8 + %)9!: +	%*3;< + %+=3' + %"!(73 +
%""->?,@_0/*B.ℎ+%"#5+CD@./E	CDFFG,@ +	%"$H,>/	CDFFG,@ + 	I                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in our model. The mean 
values of real earnings management variable (EM_RM) is -0.0328 which is higher than 
the mean value of -0.006 reported in Cheng et al. (2015), and the mean value of 
performance-matched real earnings management (EM_PRM) is -0.0185. The mean 
value of accrual-based earnings management (EM_MJM) is -0.0292, and the mean 
value of performance-matched accrual-based earnings is -0.0095. The mean value of 
our financial reporting quality index (FRQ_index) is -0.0138. The AC disclosure tone 
measures viz. ACT_Litigious and ACT_Constrain show that 0.375 of the words in the 
AC reports are included in Loughran and McDonald Litigious Word List and 0.508 of 
the words are included in Loughran and McDonald Constrain Word List respectively. 
The mean value of the aggregate tone measure (ACT_LIWC) is 1.401 which is higher 
than the mean value of 0.901 reported in Smith (2019) based on the positive and 
negative words in the LIWC word lists. 
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Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation for the variables in our main analysis 
we find that ACT_Litigious, ACT_Constrain are negatively associated with real 
earnings management (EM_RM) and correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% 
level. ACT_LIWC is also negatively associated with EM_RM, the correlation coefficient 
is significant at 10% level. These coefficients suggest a negative correlation between 
AC disclosure tone and earnings management. ACStrength and BODStrength are also 
negatively correlated with earnings management. None of the correlations between 
control variables are high enough to raise a multicollinearity issue as the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) values range from 1.07 and 2.75 With a mean value of 2.17. 
[Table 3 and 4 about here] 
 
5.2. AC Report Disclosure Tone and Real Earnings Management 
Table 5 presents our main findings on the impact of AC disclosure tone and financial 
reporting quality measured by real earnings management (EM_RM) and 
performance-matched real earnings management (EM_PRM). Models 5.1 and 5.2 use 
ACT_Litigious, Models 5.3 and 5.4 use ACT_Constrain, and Models 5.5 and 5.6 use 
ACT_LIWC as the AC disclosure tone measure. Our results show that ACT_Litigious 
has a negative and significant association with EM_RM at 5% level and at 5% level 
with EM_PRM. ACT_Constrain has a negative and significant association with 
EM_RM at 1% level and with EM_PRM at 5% level, and ACT_LIWC has a negative 
and significant association with EM_RM at 5% level and with EM_PRM at 10% level.10 
The results are also economically significant, where economic significance is 
 
10 We also investigate the impact of AC report positive tone and negative tone on earnings management. our 
untabulated results reveal that Ac report negative tone is significant and negatively associated with earnings 
management while AC report positive tone is negatively associated with EM but not significant. 
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computed following Huang et al. (2018). For example, Model 5.1 shows that the 
coefficient of -0.0381 for ACT_Litigious indicates that moving from the first quartile 
(0.220) to the third quartile (0.500) of ACT_Litigious can decrease a firm’s real earnings 
management by 1.067%. Similarly, in Model 5.3 the coefficient of -0.031 for 
ACT_Constrain indicates that moving from the first quartile (0.350) to the third quartile 
(0.650) of ACT_Constrain can decrease a firm’s real earnings management by 0.933%. 
In Model 5.5, the coefficient of -0.0114 for ACT_LIWC indicates that moving from the 
first quartile (1.224) to the third quartile (1.542) of ACT_LIWC can decrease real 
earnings management by 0.362%. Therefore, consistent with our hypothesis, we find 
that the tone of AC disclosures is associated with lower level of real earnings 
management activities.  
Our results also show that ACStrength has a negative and significant association 
with real earnings management metrics at 1% level for Models 5.1-5.6. These findings 
are consistent with the view that ACs mitigate earnings management by supervising 
major accounting choices and supporting correction of discovered errors and 
generally improving quality of reporting and auditing (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; 
Piot and Janin, 2007; Zaman et al., 2011; Libby et al., 2015). Among other control 
variables, we find LEV has a significant and positive association, and Sales_growth has 
a significant and negative association with real earnings management proxies 
indicating that both capital structure and growth opportunities are likely to affect real 
earnings management (Cheng et al., 2016; Katmon and Al Farooque, 2017). 
Prior literature argues that REM is less subject to auditor scrutiny (e.g., Kim 
and Park, 2014). The real economic actions that a company engage in to meet specific 
earnings targets is difficult to confront by auditors or regulators (Graham et al., 2005). 
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We investigate whether ACs are responding to aggressive REM by disclosing 
activities that capture the underlying risks of their firms, where ACs and auditors may 
perceive lower-magnitude REM as ordinary business operations. We divide the 
sample into firms that are the top quintile REM (i.e., higher-magnitude REM) and 
firms at the lower quintile REM (i.e., lower-magnitude REM) (see Greiner et al. 2017 
for a similar approach). Our untabulated results show that for subsample with higher-
magnitude REM, ACT_Constrain has a negative and significant association with 
EM_RM at 10% level, and with EM_PRM at 1% level, and ACT_LIWC has a negative 
and significant association with EM_RM at 5% level, and with EM_PRM at 1% level. 
For subsample with lower-magnitude REM, AC disclosure tone measures do not 
show an association with REM proxies suggesting that ACs may perceive lower-
magnitude REM as ordinary business operations and their reporting is more likely to 
have an effect in constraining higher-magnitude REM rather than lower-magnitude 
REM. Interestingly, ACStrength has a negative and significant association with real 
earnings management metrics for lower-magnitude REM subsample, but not for 
higher levels REM,  suggesting that aggressive REM requires additional substantive 
oversight and AC engagement through AC disclosure activities that capture the 
increased business risks, more than specific features of ACs. 
Our paper contributes to the textual analysis literature. Prior studies explore 
how the readability of annual reports, used as an aspect of textual analysis, varies with 
earnings management (Ajina et al., 2016; Lo et al., 2017) and shows that firms most 
likely to engage in earnings manipulation have difficult to read annual reports. 
Whereas we focus on the tone of a document, in particular of AC reports, and its 
association with earnings management. Overall, the evidence in Table 5 suggests that 
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the tone of AC disclosures, as expressed in the choice of words used in describing AC 
engagement, conveys information that affects the communication function of AC 
reporting thereby improving reporting quality. ACs disclose activities that capture the 
underlying risks of their firms by utilizing litigious and constrain words in the AC 
reports. Such disclosure increases the transparency of AC monitoring and enhances 
the quality of reporting. Our analysis of AC report tone suggests that AC disclosures 
are not boilerplate but varied in language choice, and that this is associated with 
reduced earnings management and hence higher financial reporting quality. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
5.3. Additional Analyses   
5.3.1. Alternative measures of earnings management  
We conduct additional analysis using alternative proxies for earnings management. 
In untabulated test, we use accrual-based earnings management and financial 
reporting quality index (FRQ_Index) computed as the standardized average of the four 
proxies of earnings management multiplied by minus one so that it is increasing in 
reporting quality. In the additional tests we use ACT_Litigious, ACT_Constrain, and 
ACT_LIWC as the AC tone measure. Our results show that ACT_Litigious has a 
negative and significant association with EM_MJM at 1% level and ACT_Constrain has 
a negative and significant association with EM_MJM at 10% level. ACT_LIWC does 
not seem to have a significant association with accrual-based earnings management. 
ACStrength has a negative and significant association with accrual-based earnings 
management metrics at 1% level. 
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We further find (results untabulated) that FRQ_Index has a positive and 
significant association with ACT_Litigious (at 10% level), ACT_Constrain (at 1% level) 
and ACT_LIWC (at 5% level) indicating that the disclosure tone used in AC reports 
helps in improving financial reporting quality. Also, ACStrength has a positive and 
significant association with FRQ_Index at 1% level. Our findings from these additional 
tests are consistent with our previous findings and support our hypothesis on the 
negative association between AC report disclosure tone and earnings management.  
Overall, our findings show that tone of audit committee disclosures, reflecting 
the linguistic choice of audit committees in describing their activity, seems to be 
communicated in a manner that helps to improve financial reporting quality.  
 
5.3.2 Controlling for endogeneity 
Although our results indicate that AC disclosure tone is negatively associated with 
earnings management proxies and helps in improving financial reporting quality, and 
despite our attempt to include a comprehensive set of control variables, it is possible 
that there are other underlying factors that drive our results. Firms with high earnings 
management may have propensity to disclose less or strategically manipulate the tone 
of disclosures to hide bad news and make earnings management activities less visible. 
This suggests that earnings management metrics and AC disclosure tone can be 
endogenously determined and thus could bias the regression results. Moreover, 
studies examining voluntary disclosures face selection bias issues (Katmon and Al 
Farooque, 2017; Bratten et al., 2019). To address these issues, we conduct two 
supplementary tests that attempt to control for endogeneity resulting from sample 
selection bias and omitted variables issue.  
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To solve sample selection bias, we employ the Heckman (1979) two-step 
approach consistent with Katmon and Al Farooque (2017). In the first stage, we run a 
probit model where the dependent variable is an indicator variable 
(Constrain_indicator/ Litigious_indicator), which equals one for observations where 
ACT_Constrain/ACT_Litigious is greater than the median value and zero for 
observations where it is less than the median value, and regress it on AC, board and 
firm-specific variables. We then compute the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) and include it 
in the second-stage regressions reported in Table 6 in order to control for the sample 
selection bias in our dataset.11 Our inferences remain unchanged when using the 
Heckman (1979) two-step approach. 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
To address the endogeneity that may result from model misspecification, we 
test the main findings on a matched sample using the propensity score matching 
technique (PSM). We first run a probit model that uses Constrain_indicator/ 
Litigious_indicator as the dependent variable and variables that determine AC 
disclosures such as firm-specific variables, AC and board variables as regressors. We 
then estimate the propensity score and match based on it for each year-industry group 
using a 1% radius matching approach (Shipman et al., 2017). The quality of the 
matching performed shows a Rubin’s B value below 25% and a Rubin’s R value 
between 0.5 and 2, with mostly insignificant differences in the variables between the 
 
11 The first step regression is performed in order to obtain the ‘Inverse Mill Ratio (IMR)’ that can be used in 
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treatment and control groups. The untabulated results confirm the main findings and 
the absence of endogeneity bias. 
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the effect of AC reporting on financial reporting quality as 
proxied by earnings management. We focus on AC disclosure tone and use textual 
analysis to assess the tone of AC reports. We utilise the litigation and constrain word 
dictionaries created by Loughran and McDonald (2011), measured by the word count 
frequency in the AC reports. We also measure the tone of AC disclosures in terms of 
an aggregate number measured as the sum of the frequency of positive words and 
frequency of negative words divided by the total word count using LIWC custom 
dictionary of positive and negative word lists. We use various measures for earnings 
management, our proxy for financial reporting quality. Using a sample of FTSE 350 
firms, we find AC disclosure tone has a significant and negative association with REM 
proxies. When we divide the sample into firms at the top quintile REM and firms at 
lower levels quintile REM, finding shows that AC disclosure tone is negatively 
associated with higher-magnitude REM indicating that AC reporting helps reduce 
aggressing earnings behaviour while lower-magnitude REM may be perceived as 
ordinary business operations. 
Our additional tests show that AC disclosure tone has a significant and 
negative association with accrual-based earnings and a positive and significant 
association with financial reporting quality index. The results support our hypothesis 
that the tone of AC disclosures is associated with financial reporting quality as proxied 
by earnings management. The tone of AC disclosures, as expressed in the choice of 
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words used in describing AC activity, seems to convey information that affects the 
communication function of AC reporting and thereby help improve reporting quality.  
Our paper has a few limitations. Future research could improve on our 
measurements and examine alternative conceptualisation and measurement of AC 
engagement and reporting. Future research could also explore to what extent the tone 
of AC reports is separate from the tone of other elements of the report. While our 
paper is an early attempt at extending AC research by focusing on textual analysis of 
AC reports and moving beyond AC characteristics and in complementing qualitative 
studies, our paper is subject to both data and measurement limitations. Our focus in 
this paper has been on financial reporting quality as proxied by earnings management. 
Examining alternative measures of reporting quality as well the impact of AC 
reporting on audit quality would make valuable extensions to our paper. Moreover, 
exploring AC reporting in different institutional settings and in particular time 
periods are also potential avenues for extending AC research. 
Our paper provides a valuable baseline evidence for future academic research 
and policy making. It shows that AC disclosures are not boilerplate but are varied in 
use of language choice and this affects financial reporting quality. Overall, our 
research suggests that AC reporting can aid transparency and improve the quality of 
financial reporting.  
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Table 1: Sample 
 
FTSE350 companies 700 firm-years 
Less:  
Banks and Insurance  (130) firm-years 
Utilities (14) firm-years  
Missing data (16) firm-years 
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Table 2: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definitions 
EM_MJM Discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model.  
EM_PEM Performance-matched earnings management proxy following Kothari et al. 
(2005) 
EM_RM An aggregate measure of real earnings management activities and is calculated 
as the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one and 
abnormal production costs. 
EM_PRM Performance-matched real earnings management proxy following Kothari et al. 
(2005) 
FRQ_index The financial reporting quality index is computed as the standardized average of 
the four proxies of earnings management multiplied by minus one so that it is 
increasing in reporting quality following Biddle et al. (2009). 
ACT_Litigious Represents the word count frequency in the audit report based on the Loughran 
and McDonald Litigious Word List. 
ACT_Constrain Represents the word count frequency in the audit report based on the Loughran 
and McDonald Constrain Word List 
ACT_LIWC Calculated as (POSITIVE-NEGATIVE)/total word count, where POSITIVE and 
NEGATIVE refer to the word count frequency based on the positive and 
negative words in the LIWC word lists, respectively. 
ACStrength Index measures the strength of audit committee computed by totalling the 
proxies of five AC characteristics: ACSIZE: Dummy variable if number of AC 
members is higher than the industry median 1, otherwise 0; ACIND: Dummy 
variable if the percentage of independent directors on audit committee is higher 
than the industry median 1, otherwise 0; ACMEET: Dummy variable if number 
of AC meetings is higher than the industry median 1, otherwise 0; ACEXP: 
Dummy variable if the number of AC members with financial expertise is higher 
than the industry median 1, otherwise 0; ACF: Dummy variable if the number of 
female members on audit committee is higher than the industry median 1, 
otherwise 0 
BODStrength Index measures the strength of corporate board computed by totalling the 
proxies of six board characteristics: BODSIZE: Dummy variable if number of 
board members is higher than the industry median 1, otherwise 0; BODIND: 
Dummy variable if the percentage of independent directors on board is higher 
than the industry median 1, otherwise 0; BODMEET: Dummy variable if number 
of board meetings is higher than the industry median 1, otherwise 0; BODEXP: 
Dummy variable if the percentage of board members with financial expertise is 
higher than the industry median 1, otherwise 0; BODF: Dummy variable if the 
percentage of female directors on board is higher than the industry median 1, 
otherwise 0; DUALITY: Dummy variable if the chief executive officer (CEO) and 
board chair role is separate 1, otherwise 0. 
SIZE Firm size: Natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
FAGE Number of years since a firm listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
BSEG Represents the complexity of the business calculated as the logarithm of the 
number of operating segments of the firm  
LEV Systematic risks: Ratio of total liabilities divided by total assets.  
OWN The sum of shares held by block-holders of greater than 5% divided by the total 
number of shares in issue. 
ROA Firm profitability: measured using Net income before extraordinary item 
divided by total assets.  
CFO A proxy for liquidity which represents cash flow from operating activities 
divided by total assets  
Sales_growth  The annual growth of sales calculated as the change in sales from previous year 
scaled by sales at the beginning of the year 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
EM_RM 540 -0.033 0.359 -0.978 0.752 
EM_PRM 540 -0.019 0.349 -0.983 0.715 
EM_MJM 540 -0.029 0.056 -0.441 0.165 
EM_PEM 540 -0.010 0.054 -0.251 0.217 
FRQ_index 540 -0.014 0.108 -0.518 0.362 
ACT_Litigious 540 0.375 0.221 0.000 5.818 
ACT_Constrain 540 0.508 0.222 0.000 5.792 
ACT_LIWC 540 1.401 0.307 -0.880 2.662 
ACStrength 540 2.397 1.160 0.000 5.000 
BODStrength 540 1.956 1.433 0.000 5.000 
SIZE 540 14.552 1.434 10.402 19.942 
FAGE 540 23.557 20.462 0.000 69.000 
BSEG 540 3.312 2.424 1.000 10.000 
LEV 540 0.534 0.297 0.003 1.547 
OWN 540 4.416 0.285 3.258 4.605 
ROA 540 0.083 0.077 -0.147 0.325 
CFO 540 0.109 0.172 -0.081 2.819 
Sales_growth 540 0.023 0.384 -2.231 1.044 
Variables winsorised to adjust for outliers. Variables are as defined in Table 2. 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix  
 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 EM_RM 1              
2 ACT_Litigious -0.1146** 1             
3 ACT_Constrain -0.1565** 0.5689* 1            
4 ACT_LIWC -0.078* 0.2930* 0.3165* 1           
5 ACStrength -0.1326** 0.1429* 0.1678* 0.1028* 1          
6 BODStrength -0.0749 0.2127* 0.1663* 0.0587 0.4247* 1         
7 SIZE -0.0247 0.3195* 0.2989* 0.1472* 0.2765* 0.5072* 1        
8 FAGE 0.0688 -0.0691 -0.0558 -0.0357 -0.0148 0.03 0.0892* 1       
9 BSEG -0.0572 0.1881* 0.1645* 0.0266 0.1524* 0.2712* 0.2041* 0.0042 1      
10 LEV 0.0139 0.0837** 0.0868** 0.0900* 0.2598* 0.2958* 0.2534* -0.1518* 0.2145* 1     
11 OWN 0.0949* -0.0401 -0.0705 -0.0714 0.0682 -0.0041 -0.0068 0.2437* -0.0840* 0.0479 1    
12 ROA 0.0042 -0.0756 -0.1554* -0.0554 -0.0624 -0.0970* -0.1686* 0.0952* -0.0772 -0.1157* 0.0785 1   
13 CFO -0.0627 -0.0516 -0.0128 0.0067 0.1582* 0.0704 -0.2541* -0.1313* 0.0928* 0.1177* -0.0263 0.1182* 1  
14 Sales_growth -0.0224 0.0144 0.043 0.0148 0.0492 0.0207 0.0092 -0.0072 0.0297 0.0765 -0.0218 0.0537 0.0238 1 
This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix between the variables used in our analyses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.  
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Table 5: AC Report Disclosure Tone and Real Earnings Management 
Variables EM_RM EM_PRM EM_RM EM_PRM EM_RM EM_PRM 
 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3  Model 5.4 Model 5.5  Model 5.6  
ACT_Litigious -0.0381** -0.0351**     
 [-2.41] [-2.25]     
ACT_Constrain   -0.0311*** -0.0260**   
   [-2.92] [-2.49]   
ACT_LIWC     -0.0114** -0.0114* 
     [-1.97] [-1.94] 
ACStrength -0.0493*** -0.0416** -0.0364*** -0.0308*** -0.0376*** -0.0317*** 
 [-2.98] [-2.55] [-3.97] [-3.43] [-3.99] [-3.44] 
BODStrength -0.0044 -0.0035 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 [-0.31] [-0.26] [-0.06] [-0.05] [-0.09] [-0.10] 
SIZE -0.0035 0.0226 -0.0088 0.0104 -0.0118 0.0083 
 [-0.24] [1.62] [-1.06] [1.32] [-1.44] [1.07] 
FAGE 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 
 [0.59] [0.41] [1.14] [1.09] [1.23] [1.15] 
BSEG -0.0079 -0.0112 -0.0046 -0.0067 -0.0056 -0.0076* 
 [-1.03] [-1.50] [-1.06] [-1.59] [-1.23] [-1.72] 
LEV 0.1970*** 0.1560*** 0.1461*** 0.1140*** 0.1521*** 0.1193*** 
 [3.31] [2.63] [4.03] [3.18] [4.08] [3.26] 
OWN 0.1284*** 0.1323*** 0.0635** 0.0690** 0.0655** 0.0701** 
 [2.81] [2.96] [2.10] [2.31] [2.15] [2.33] 
ROA 0.0256 0.0911 0.0072 0.0416 0.02 0.0522 
 [0.11] [0.41] [0.05] [0.30] [0.13] [0.36] 
CFO -0.0874 -0.0176 -0.1243 -0.0715 -0.1205 -0.0677 
 [-0.56] [-0.13] [-1.10] [-0.70] [-1.07] [-0.67] 
Sales_growth -0.0020*** -0.0022*** -0.0006 -0.0007* -0.0010** -0.0011** 
 [-2.80] [-3.05] [-1.51] [-1.84] [-2.20] [-2.45] 
Industry dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year dummy  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Intercept -0.5375* -0.8127*** -0.135 -0.3578** -0.1414 -0.3620** 
 [-1.96] [-3.11] [-0.75] [-2.08] [-0.78] [-2.09] 
R-squared 0.0679 0.0578 0.1065 0.0803 0.0958 0.0737 
N 540 540 540 540 540 540 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. EM_RM=real earnings management; EM_PRM= performance-matched real 
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Table 6: AC Report Disclosure Tone and Earnings Management: 
Heckman (1979) two-step Approach 
 
Variables EM_RM EM_PRM EM_RM EM_PRM 
 Model 6.1 Model 6.2 Model 6.3 Model 6.4 
ACT_Constrain -0.0597** -0.0271   
 [-1.99] [-1.57]   
ACT_Litigious   -0.0459** -0.0517** 
   [-1.97] [-2.30] 
ACStrength -0.0509*** -0.0192* -0.0534*** -0.0317* 
 [-2.76] [-1.81] [-3.04] [-1.86] 
BODStrength -0.0164 -0.0164 0.0269 0.0269 
 [-0.33] [-0.33] [0.54] [0.54] 
SIZE 0.2178*** 0.2178*** 0.2677*** 0.2677*** 
 [3.97] [3.97] [4.75] [4.75] 
FAGE -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0062** -0.0062** 
 [-1.11] [-1.11] [-2.08] [-2.08] 
BSEG 0.0627** 0.0627** 0.0543** 0.0543** 
 [2.36] [2.36] [2.00] [2.00] 
LEV -0.1716 -0.1716 -0.0432 -0.0432 
 [-0.70] [-0.70] [-0.18] [-0.18] 
OWN -0.4229* -0.4229* -0.1463 -0.1463 
 [-1.93] [-1.93] [-0.66] [-0.66] 
ROA -0.4279 -0.4279 -0.1482 -0.1482 
 [-0.53] [-0.53] [-0.19] [-0.19] 
CFO -0.0629 -0.0629 0.0279 0.0279 
 [-0.13] [-0.13] [0.07] [0.07] 
Sales_growth 0.0151 0.0151 0.0184 0.0184 
 [0.47] [0.47] [0.54] [0.54] 
IMR -0.1185 -0.0830** -0.0377 -0.1041 
 [-1.63] [-1.98] [-0.58] [-1.63] 
Industry dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  
Year dummy  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Intercept 0.3109** 0.1589** 0.2041** 0.2357*** 
 [2.53] [2.25] [2.18] [2.58] 
R-squared 0.0757 0.0802 0.0695 0.0578 
N 540 540 540 540 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. EM_RM=real earnings management; EM_PRM= performance-matched real 
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Appendix: Illustrative Examples of AC Report Disclosures 
 
CRH Plc “Revenue and expenses associated with that contract should be recognised 
by reference to the stage of completion of the contract activity at the balance sheet 
date. If it is anticipated that the contract will be loss-making, the expected loss must 
be recognised immediately.” 
 
Admiral Group plc “The Audit Committee considered the provision for claims 
outstanding comprising provisions for the estimated cost of setting all claims incurred 
but unpaid as at the balance sheet date, whether reported or not.” 
 
Wolseley Plc “The Committee considered the provisions held and settlements made in 
relation to litigation disputes, potential product liability and environmental claims.” 
 
Diageo Plc “AC committee agreed that adequate provision has been made for all 
material litigation and disputes, based on the currently perceived probability of the 
outcomes.” 
 
Taylor Wimpey Plc “The Committee will continue to focus on ensuring that all the 
relevant codes and regulations are complied with to ensure that the business is 
operating in a controlled and managed environment.” 
 
SSE Plc “The Group is exposed to the risk of litigation and contractual disputes 
through the course of its normal operations. The Group needs to consider the level of 
provision or disclosure in relation to these claims utilising legal advice which is an 
inherently subjective process.” 
 
Schroders Plc “The key judgements used in determining the provisions and contingent 
liabilities where there is uncertainty over the timing of settlement or amount. The 
Committee considered and discussed with management and PwC the work 
performed to confirm the value of the provision, the main areas of uncertainty and the 
appropriateness of the related disclosures contained within this Annual Report and 
Accounts.” 
 
Rolls-Royce Holding Plc “The amount of revenue and profit recognised during any 
period requires a significant number of accounting judgements and estimates. 
Consequently, one of our primary responsibilities is to ensure that the bases for these 
judgements and estimates are robust.” 
 
Pearson Plc “The committee regularly reviews revenue recognition practice and the 
underlying assumptions and estimates. In addition, the committee has visibility of 
internal audit findings relating to revenue recognition controls and processes and 
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Rio Tinto plc “The Committee also focused on the different remediation or closure 
outcomes which could realistically arise when assessing the adequacy of the 
provisioning for these obligations. Both involve complex judgments. The Committee 
focused on the estimates of risk-free discount rates in light of the ongoing impact of 
fiscal interventions. It also focused on the probability weighting, where appropriate, 
of the different remediation or closure outcomes which could realistically arise when 




Travis Perkins “The Committee considered the Group’s provisions for unresolved tax 
positions. It has received regular updates from management during the year and at 
the year-end received a paper setting out the latest position based upon the most 
recent discussions with the Group’s advisors and with HMRC. The Committee 
concluded that the uncertainty justified the provisions held and that the Group’s tax 
position was fairly stated and appropriately provisioned. The Group is currently in 
discussion with H. M. Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) about the tax treatment of 
several commercial transactions. The outcome of these discussions is uncertain and so 
the Group has had to consider what benefits it is appropriate to recognise in the 
income statement.” 
 
Vodafone Group “The timing of revenue recognition, the recognition of revenue on a 
gross or net basis, the treatment of discounts, incentives and commissions and the 
accounting for multi-element arrangements are complex areas of accounting.” 
 
The Sage Group “The key area of judgement and complexity is the timing of revenue 
recognition, particularly in relation to the recognition and deferral of revenue on 
maintenance and support contracts, for instance, where products are bundled. The 
Group recognises certain provisions and accruals in respect of tax which involves a 
degree of estimation and uncertainty for certain items whose tax treatment cannot be 
finally determined until a resolution has been reached with the relevant tax 
authority.” 
 
 
